Last month, Representative Jim Himes (D-Conn) and his co-sponsors, Representatives Carolyn B. Maloney (D-NY) and Denny Heck (D-WA), introduced H.R. 2534:  The Insider Trading Prohibition Act.  Unlike its substantially similar predecessor, H.R. 1625, which was introduced by Representative Himes on March 25, 2015, H.R. 2534 has gained some momentum in the U.S. House of Representatives, having been unanimously approved by the Financial Services Committee in May 2019.  Although the bill is only at the preliminary stage, if the proposal eventually proceeds further in the process of becoming law, it will represent a potentially significant shift in and clarification of U.S. insider trading laws.
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Last month, Representative Maxine Waters, Chair of the House Financial Services Committee, introduced a discussion draft of the “Bad Actor Disqualification Act of 2019” (the “Proposed Act”).  Similar to proposed legislation Rep. Waters introduced in 2015 and 2017, the effect of the Proposed Act, if passed, would be to dramatically increase the burdens on institutions

On March 27, 2019, the Supreme Court issued a 6-to-2 decision in Lorenzo v. SEC focusing on the distinction between “making” a false statement under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5(b) and engaging in deceptive conduct—so-called “scheme liability”—under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c).

The Court upheld a D.C. Circuit majority decision concluding that the SEC could hold an

On January 29, 2019, the SEC announced four settlements with publicly-traded companies for failure to maintain adequate internal control over financial reporting.

None of the companies was charged with making false or inaccurate statements, either about its ICFR or otherwise; indeed, each had repeatedly disclosed material weaknesses in ICFR over many years.

These cases are

Last week, in SEC v. Scoville, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that Dodd-Frank allows the Securities and Exchange Commission to bring fraud claims based on sales of securities to foreign buyers where defendants engage in fraudulent conduct within the United States.

In so holding, the Court concluded that Dodd-Frank

On December 26, 2018, the SEC announced settled charges against ADT Inc. after finding that ADT, in two earnings releases, gave undue emphasis to non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA figures because they identified the relevant GAAP measures only later and much less prominently.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s factual or legal claims, ADT agreed to an

There have been plenty of press reports about the SEC’s settlement with Elon Musk arising from his tweeting about taking Tesla private.  But the concurrent settlement with Tesla itself provides interesting lessons for disclosure and governance at public companies.

Tesla agreed to pay a $20 million penalty and agreed to several “undertakings” to strengthen its governance and controls including a requirement that it add two independent directors to its Board.  And, under his own settlement, Musk agreed to step down for three years as chairman of the Board of Directors, although he is allowed to continue as CEO. 
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On August 27, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced a $34.5 million settlement with investment management firm Legg Mason, Inc. (“Legg Mason” or the “Company”) for violating the internal controls provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in connection with a scheme to bribe Libyan government officials to secure investments from Libyan state-owned financial institutions.[1]  The SEC settlement follows a June 2018 non-prosecution agreement between Legg Mason and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) regarding the same conduct.[2]  Under the non-prosecution agreement, Legg Mason agreed to pay $64.2 million.  The Legg Mason settlements reflect the increased focus of U.S. authorities on coordinating with other authorities in imposing penalties on a company, including not “piling on,” and the continued enforcement of the FCPA, while highlighting the potential risks under the FCPA of not having proper controls in place for assessing use of third party intermediaries.

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On July 18, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”) voted to approve a final rule (the “Final Rule”) amending Regulation Alternative Trading System (“Regulation ATS”) to require alternative trading systems (“ATSs”) that trade national market system (“NMS”) stocks (“NMS Stock ATSs”) to file with the SEC new Form ATS-N to begin operations or, for currently operating ATSs, to continue operations.  Form ATS-N will provide for enhanced disclosures regarding the ATS’s operations and relationship with its broker-dealer operator relative to current Form ATS and will be publicly available.  Importantly, unlike under the November 2015 proposal (the “Proposed Rule”), the SEC would automatically deem the Form ATS-N submissions to be effective after the review period, unless the Commission found it to be ineffective.
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Last month, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari in Lorenzo v. SEC,[1] a case where Francis Lorenzo, a registered representative of a broker-dealer, allegedly emailed false and misleading statements to investors that were originally drafted by his boss.  After administrative and Commission findings of liability, a divided panel of the D.C. Circuit determined that, while Lorenzo was not the “maker” of the statements, he did use them to deceive investors, and thereby violated the so-called scheme liability provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder.  As described in the petitioner’s motion seeking certiorari, the case presents the question whether, under the Court’s 2011 Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders decision,[2] the scheme liability provisions of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) may be used to find liability in connection with false or misleading statements by persons who are not themselves the maker of those statements and, thus, not liable under the false-and-misleading statements provision of Rule 10b-5(b).[3]  The answer to this question could have implications for the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or “Commission”) Enforcement Division as well as potentially significant implications for private securities litigants who principally rely on Section 10(b) to bring private causes of action sounding in fraud. 
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