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Breon S. Peace’s practice focuses on white-collar defense, regulatory enforcement matters and complex civil litigation.

On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt with respect to the applicable statute of limitations in a FCA action in which the Government has declined to intervene.  The FCA sets forth two limitation periods applicable to FCA actions and provides that an action must be brought within the longer of either (i) within 6 years after the date on which the violation occurred; or (ii) within three years of the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by a relevant official of the United States.  In no event may an action be brought more than 10 years after the date on which the violation was committed.  The issues in Cochise Consultancy were whether the second, alternative, limitations period applies to an action in which the government has intervened and whether, if so, the relevant official includes the private relator.  These issues are important because, if the longer period applies, a relator can bring an action long after (and more than 3 years after) she learned of the FCA violation.
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On May 8, 2019, the Division of Enforcement of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission released an Enforcement Manual – the first public document of its kind from the Division.

Though the Manual does not reveal any significant shifts in policy, it will undoubtedly serve as an important resource for individuals and entities dealing with CFTC

On May 7, 2019, the Department of Justice issued formal guidance to DOJ’s False Claims Act litigators on the circumstances in which DOJ will grant credit for cooperation during FCA investigations.

The guidance explains the factors that DOJ considers in determining whether to award cooperation credit in FCA investigations and the types of credit available.

On May 2, 2019, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York issued an important decision delineating the boundaries between conducting a proper internal investigation and acting as an arm of the government.

For the government, the consequences of “outsourcing” an investigation to a company and its counsel could be exclusion

On July 12 and 16, 2018, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) announced two awards to whistleblowers, one its largest-ever award, approximately $30 million, and another its first award to a whistleblower living in a foreign country.[1]  These awards—along with recent proposed changes meant to bolster the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC” or “Commission”) own whistleblower regime—demonstrate that such programs likely will continue to be significant parts of the enforcement programs of both agencies and necessarily help shape their enforcement agendas in the coming years.
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Yesterday the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a non-prosecution agreement (“NPA”) with a Hong Kong-based subsidiary of Credit Suisse Group AG arising out of the so-called “princelings” scandals of recent years—the practice of hiring unqualified, but politically-connected, relatives of Chinese officials to garner business from state-owned firms.[1]  Per Credit Suisse’s admissions, “bankers discussed and approved the hiring of close friends and family of Chinese officials in order to secure business,” resulting in $46 million “in profits from business mandates with Chinese” state-owned enterprises.  As part of the resolution, Credit Suisse agreed to a $47 million criminal penalty, to continue to cooperate with DOJ, and to enhance its compliance program, including adopting additional controls around hiring.  In addition, Credit Suisse agreed to pay nearly $25 million in disgorgement and $4.8 million in prejudgment interest to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).  In its press release, DOJ stated that it was giving Credit Suisse a 15 percent discount from the bottom end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for its cooperation in the investigation, while also (as discussed more below) noting steps the firm did not take that worked to limit the amount of such cooperation credit.  While this is hardly the first of the “princelings” cases, it does demonstrate DOJ’s continued commitment to the cooperation framework it laid out in its FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (“Enforcement Policy”) late last year.[2]

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On November 29, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or the “Department”) announced a new FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (the “Enforcement Policy”) applicable to investigations of companies under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). The Enforcement Policy builds on the FCPA Pilot Program (the “Pilot Program”) that has been in effect since April 2016,

In a September 25, 2017 speech in New York, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”) Division of Enforcement (the “Division”) Director James McDonald outlined the CFTC’s focus on creating greater incentives for self-reporting and cooperation in order to deter and detect misconduct in the commodities markets. Director McDonald’s speech accompanied the release of an