News and Analysis Related to Global Enforcement, White-Collar, and Regulatory Trends and Developments
On September 3, 2020, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ issued a revised Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, following shortly after it announced a reorganization of its civil enforcement to create an Office of Decree Enforcement and Compliance.
The Policy Guide to Merger Remedies largely codifies a trend towards strengthening of the Division’s preference…
On June 1, 2020, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “Department”) released revisions to its guidance regarding the Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs, which the Department uses in assessing the “adequacy and effectiveness” of a company’s compliance program in connection with any decision to charge or resolve a criminal investigation, including…
The following post was originally included as part of our recently published memorandum “Selected Issues for Boards of Directors in 2020”.
Enforcement of anti-bribery, sanctions and money laundering laws remains a top priority for US authorities. In 2019, the US Department of Justice and civil regulators issued new or updated policies aimed at…
On May 13, 2019, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Hunt with respect to the applicable statute of limitations in a FCA action in which the Government has declined to intervene. The FCA sets forth two limitation periods applicable to FCA actions and provides that an action must be brought within the longer of either (i) within 6 years after the date on which the violation occurred; or (ii) within three years of the date when facts material to the right of action are known or reasonably should have been known by a relevant official of the United States. In no event may an action be brought more than 10 years after the date on which the violation was committed. The issues in Cochise Consultancy were whether the second, alternative, limitations period applies to an action in which the government has intervened and whether, if so, the relevant official includes the private relator. These issues are important because, if the longer period applies, a relator can bring an action long after (and more than 3 years after) she learned of the FCA violation.
Continue Reading Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Longer Time Limits for Non-intervened FCA Actions
On May 7, 2019, the Department of Justice issued formal guidance to DOJ’s False Claims Act litigators on the circumstances in which DOJ will grant credit for cooperation during FCA investigations.
The guidance explains the factors that DOJ considers in determining whether to award cooperation credit in FCA investigations and the types of credit available.…
As discussed in our most recent blog post, on April 30, 2019, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ” or “the Department”) announced updated guidance for the Criminal Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (“the Guidance”). The Guidance is relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in conducting an investigation of a corporation, determining whether to bring charges, negotiating plea or other agreements, applying sentencing guidelines and appointing monitors.[1] The Guidance focuses on familiar factors: the adoption of a well-designed compliance program that addresses the greatest compliance risks to the company, the effective implementation of the company’s compliance policies and procedures, and the adequacy of the compliance program at the time of any misconduct and the response to that misconduct. The Guidance makes clear that there is no one-size-fits-all compliance program and that primary responsibility for the compliance program will lie with senior and middle management and those in control functions.
Continue Reading DOJ Guidance on Corporate Compliance Programs: A Checklist for Directors
On April 30, 2019, the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice announced updated guidance for the Criminal Division’s Evaluation of Corporate Compliance Programs (“the Guidance”) in charging and resolving criminal cases. This memorandum highlights key updates and discusses the themes present across versions of the Guidance. Overall, this newest version places greater emphasis…
On March 25, 2019, partners Lev Dassin and Arthur Kohn participated in a webcast hosted by The Conference Board, entitled “Corporate Prosecutions: What Companies, Boards and Executives Need to Know.” Daniel Gitner, a partner at Lankler Siffert & Wohl, also participated on the panel.
The panelists and moderator Doug Chia, executive director of The Conference Board, began by discussing corporate prosecutions generally, including the history of corporate prosecutions and how DOJ attitudes regarding corporate prosecutions have changed over time. Dassin explained that the DOJ has more recently refocused its attention on prosecuting individuals engaged in corporate misconduct.
Continue Reading Cleary Partners Participate in Panel Discussion on Corporate Prosecutions
In a recent speech at the annual ABA White Collar Crime Conference in New Orleans, Assistant Attorney General Brian Benczkowski of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced certain changes to the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy (“the Enforcement Policy” or “Policy”) to address issues that the DOJ had identified since its implementation.[1] These and other recent updates have since been codified in a revised Enforcement Policy in the Justice Manual.[2]
The Enforcement Policy, first announced by the DOJ in November 2017, was initially applicable only to violations of the FCPA, but was subsequently extended to all white collar matters handled by the Criminal Division.[3] The Policy was designed to encourage companies to voluntary self-disclose misconduct by providing more transparency as to the credit a company could receive for self-reporting and fully cooperating with the DOJ. Among other things, the Enforcement Policy provides a presumption that the DOJ will decline to prosecute companies that meet the DOJ’s requirement of “voluntary self-disclosure,” “full cooperation,” and “timely and appropriate remediation,” absent “aggravating circumstances” – i.e. relating to the seriousness or frequency of the violation. For more information on the Enforcement Policy, read our blog post explaining it here.
Continue Reading DOJ Updates FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy
On Friday, October 12, 2018, during remarks at the NYU School of Law Program on Corporate Compliance and Enforcement Conference on Achieving Effective Compliance, Assistant Attorney General Brian A. Benczkowski of the Department of Justice announced new guidance, issued on October 11, relating to the imposition and selection of corporate compliance monitors in Criminal Division …
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